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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No,
14703

-vsRUDY DOMINGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal action in which appellant
was charged with the crime of aggravated assault/
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before a jury in the Seventh
Judicial District Court, Carbon County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Edward Sheya, Judge, presiding*

Appellant

was found guilty as charged and sentenced to the
indeterminate term of zero to five years in the Utah
State Prison.
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I

I

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

i
Respondent asks that appellant's conviction
be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
(

Respondent stipulates to appellant'5 •
statement of facts.
(
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ACTED CORRECTLY IN ALLOWING
APPELLANT TO REPRESENT HIMSELF WITHOUT THE AID OF COUNSEL
AT TRIAL.
At his trial, appellant made the decision to
stand on his right to defend himself.
that right.

The Court granted

Now, on appeal, he alleges that the Court

committed reversible error in granting his motion for
self defense.
1.

The questions then, before this Court, are;
Does the accused have the right to defend

himself without the aid of counsel?
2.

Are there any restrictions on this right?

3.

Do any of these restrictions apply in this

case?
Respondent submits that the Courts and Constitutions of both the United States and Utah require that
a defendant be granted the right of self-representation
within certain limitationsinapplicable to the instant
case.
1.

The Courts and Constitutions of both Utah

and the United States require that an accused be allowed
to represent himself.
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Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State
Constitution grants to an accused in all criminal
prosecutions the right to appear and defend himself
in person.

This language is almost identical to

that of the Sixth Amendment to the United States .
Constitution*

The United States Supreme Court,

commenting upon this right, said:
"The Sixth Amendment does not
provide merely that a defense shall
be made for the accused; it grants
to the accused personally the right
to make his defense. It is the
accused, not counsel, who must be
1
informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation,' who must be
'confronted with the witnesses
against him,' and who must be
accorded 'compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor.'
Although not stated in the Amendment
in so many words, the right to selfrepresentation—to make one's own
defense personally—is thus necessarily
implied by the structure of the amendment."
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
45 L.Ed.2d 562, 572, 95 S.Ct. 2525
(1975). (Emphasis added.)
Furthermore:
"The right to defend is given directly
to the accused; for it is he who suffers
the consequences if the defense fails."
45 L.Ed.2d at 573. (Emphasis added.)
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Thus, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the
Sixth Amendment to require a court to allow an accused
the right to defend himself.
The Utah State Supreme Court has also spoken
out for the right of an accused to defend himself without
a lawyer:
"It is generally, if not
universally held that the accused
in a criminal proceeding who is
sui juris and not mentally incompetent
has the right to conduct his own
defense without the aid of counsel."
State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281, 288,
272 P.2d 195 (1954).
2.

Are there any limitations on the right to

self representation?
As the quote from the Utah case, supra, indicates,
the Utah Courts have indicated that an accused must be
"sui juris and not mentally incompetent," 2 Utah 2d at 288,
in order to be allowed to represent himself.

The term

"sui juris" simply means that one is capable of entering
into a contract, or that he possesses his social and
civil rights;in other words, that he is not under any legal
guardianship.

See Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed.

1969, page 1236, or Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., 1968,
page 1602.

In addition to these requirements, the federal

case asks that the accused knowingly and intelligently
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I

I

waive his right to counsel and that the accused be

i
made aware of the dangers of self-representation.
Faretta, supra, 45 L.Ed.2d at 581-582.
3.

Do any of these limitations apply here?

Respondent submits that the present appeal
is without merit since none of the above limitations
apply in the present case.

In the first place, there
i

is no question but that defendant was sui juris.
was of age and under no legal guardianship.

He

Appellant

has failed to show, or even allege, any evidence to the
contrary.

Secondly, there is no showing that appellant

did not knowingly waive his right to counsel.

On the

contrary, in a minute entry dated June 22, 197 6, it is
recorded that appellant was made fully aware, by the
Court, of the consequences of self-representation.
Third, appellant has failed to show that he was not
made aware of the dangers inherent in self-representation.
Again on the contrary, the minute entry reports that
the Court fully advised the appellant as to the procedures
involved in representing himself, and what the consequences
could be.

See Record on Appeal, un~numbered page.

As

the Supreme Court pointed out, whether or not an accused
possesses technical legal knowledge is not relevant to the
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to the question of whether or not he knowingly chose to
represent himself*

Faretta, supra at 582. Finally,

appellant has failed to adequately prove that he was
not mentally competent to defend himself.

Appellant

argues that if he was insane at the time of the crime,
then it is arguable that he might have been at least
incompetent at the time of trial.

The problem here

is that the jury found that appellant was not insane.
In conclusion, there was absolutely no
justification for the trial judge to withhold appellant's
right to defend himself.
Appellant would argue, however, that he did
not have enough time to prepare and that he was illiterate,
implying that these facts would be a substantial basis
for denying his self-representation rights.

Respondent

would submit that there is no foundation in any of the
cases for such an implication.

Neither the Utah Court

or the United States Supreme Court require that a man
must be literate in order to defend himself, and as for
being prepared, this is not the same as if appellant had
brought a new lawyer into the case.

Appellant had at

least as much experience with this as his attorney.

-7-
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If the above were not enough, respondent has
two further arguments for affirming appellant's conviction.

First, this is not a case wherein a man defends

himself entirely alone.

The court appointed a Mr. Jensen

to be "stand-by" counsel for appellant.

Numerous times

during the trial Mr. Jensen interrupted in order to
assist appellant in his defense (T.5,9,12,14,15,21,22,
30,31,37,39,42,47,57, et al.). At times, Mr. Jensen took
over the examination of witnesses (T.58).

He objected

to instructions (T.88) and even argued the case to the
jury (T.88).

In other words, appellant was protected,

guided and assisted most of the time by a lawyer. Therefore, this is not an ordinary case of total self-representation and this Court should take that into consideration.
Secondly, in Utah, an appellant may not induce error and
then use it as a method of obtaining a new trial.

If

there was any error in allowing appellant to represent
himself it was clearly self-induced; therefore, his
appeal must fail.

State v. Fair, 28 Utah 2d 242,

501 P.2d 107 (1972).
POINT II
IF ERROR, THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS WERE HARMLESS
ERROR.
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Appellant alleges that he was damaged by the
instructions that were given to the jury on the issue
of insanity.

He claims that the instructions should

have been that he could be found not guilty by reason
of insanity if he "lacked the substantial capacity to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions." As it
was,the instruction was that he could be found not
guilty by reason of insanity only if he did not know
that what he was doing was wrong.
Respondent submits that if there is any error
in the instruction as given, it is harmless.

Harmless

error may not be the basis for a new trial or reversal.
State v. Winkle, 535 P.2d 82 (Utah 1975).
The judge said appellant could be found guilty
if he knew that he had a knife and if he knew it was
wrong to use it (Instruction No. 4, second paragraph).
Therefore, if a jury felt that he partly knew, but not
fully, he could be found innocent.

That would be

exactly the same as if the judge had instructed that
insanity means he could not fully appreciate the wrong.
Both instructions are the same in that they do not
require an absolute knowledge.
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CONCLUSION
Because the trial court acted correctly in
allowing appellant to represent himself, and because
the trial judge gave the correct instruction, the
conviction of appellant should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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